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ABSTRACT. Normative ethics usually presupposes background accounts of human agency, and although 
different ethical theorists might have different pictures of human agency in mind, there is still something 
like a standard account that most of mainstream normative ethics can be understood to rest on. Ethical 
theorists tend to have Rational Man, or at least some close relative to him, in mind when constructing 
normative theories. It will be argued here that empirical findings raise doubts about the accuracy of this 
kind of account; human beings fall too far short of ideals of rationality for it to be meaningful to devise 
normative ideals within such a framework. Instead, it is suggested, normative ethics could be conducted 
more profitably if the idea of unifying all ethical concerns into one theoretical account is abandoned. This 
disunity of ethical theorizing would then match the disunited and heuristic-oriented nature of our agency.  
Philosophy and rationality are in a long-term relationship and have been so for 
thousands of years – since Plato’s time at least. The core of this relationship is a 
commitment by philosophers to advance their investigations by rational means. And 
although there are parts of philosophy where people have let go of this commitment, the 
discipline as a whole is still faithful to it and will, we hope, stay that way. But 
rationality is not just an ideal shaping and guiding the discourse within the discipline; it 
is also something that tends to figure prominently in the content or presuppositions of 
philosophical theories. For instance, in areas concerned with human action, like ethics 
and decision theory, theories tend to be constructed with a specific kind of agent in 
mind, the rational person. Although there are substantial disagreements about the role of 
reason in human action, often couched in terms indicating some variation on the 
eighteenth-century dispute between sentimentalists like Hume and rationalists like Kant, 
these disputes tend to focus on whether reason sets ends. It is more or less assumed that 
actually achieving our ends is something that we do largely in accordance with certain 
principles of rationality. At the same time, a wide range of empirical studies have shown 
that our behaviour is often far from that of someone like Rational Man; and although the 
extent to which empirical findings should be treated as relevant to theory construction in 
ethics and decision theory is certainly open to discussion, it would be somewhat 
peculiar if the growing body of empirical studies of human decision-making really had 
little or no impact on the relevant areas of philosophical investigation. 
 
In this paper we focus on the impact of scepticism about human rationality on theory 
construction in normative ethics. We will start by discussing the relevance of empirical 
research to what is fundamentally an investigation of an entirely different domain, the 
normative. Having argued that it is indeed relevant, we outline, first, an account of what 
is involved in rational agency. Here we aim to work with a relatively thin conception of 
rationality: one that is clearly embraced in mainstream decision theory and neutral with 
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respect to the main traditional theories within normative ethics. We then rehearse some 
of the relevant empirical findings and describe the picture of human agency suggested 
by them. Following this, we raise doubts about the extent to which traditional ethical 
theories can possibly fit this picture; and, finally, we suggest an alternative model for 
ethical theorizing. While we certainly agree that philosophical investigations can 
proceed by rational means, we would still suggest that, when it comes to the 
investigation of normative ethics, we should not have rational agents in mind. As can be 
seen already from this outline, our argument covers a lot of ground and so we cannot 
provide more than a survey of it. We hope the survey will, however, strongly suggest 
that there is a real need to take seriously the possibility that normative ethics should be 
largely reoriented in order to better fit the realities of human behaviour. 
THE RELEVANCE OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS TO NORMATIVE ETHICS
Normative ethics stands out precisely because it is devoted to the normative. This fact 
might make some people doubt whether empirical findings can be relevant to it at all. 
As any first-year student of moral philosophy will tell you, it is impossible to derive an 
“ought” from an “is”. This old Humean dictum certainly does present a logical truth,2 
but the question is whether the methodology of moral theory really can support the 
conclusion that nothing descriptive ever has any bearing on the kind of normative 
theory we should embrace. There are least three reasons for being wary of taking such a 
stance.
To begin with, there is a question here about the point of moral theory. Quite a few 
moral theorists have accepted the idea that the point of the enterprise is ultimately to 
guide us as agents seeking to do the right thing. This kind of view can be found already 
in Aristotle and has been defended by contemporary theorists like James Griffin (1996) 
and Christine Korsgaard (1996). There is reason to evaluate ethical theories at least 
partly in terms of a practicality criterion: ceteris paribus, a moral theory is adequate to 
the extent that it provides guidance to human agents. One could certainly dispute such a 
demand by claiming that moral theory ultimately seeks merely to represent an 
independent moral order: some things simply are good or bad, some actions simply are 
right or wrong, and a good moral theory is one that gets these matters right. If we 
human beings happen to be unable, deliberatively, to handle these moral truths in a 
capable way, then that is a sad fact about us, but it does not impinge on the enterprise of 
moral theorizing. Still, even if we accept that ultimately it might turn out that the only 
tenable moral theory is one that actually provides little or no guidance, it would seem a 
reasonable methodological principle to investigate, in the first instance at any rate, 
ethical theories with the potential to provide us with some reasonable level of guidance. 
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2 Hume’s dictum is a mantra with border conditions. Bergström (1992), for example, argues that no pure 
value judgment could logically follow from a consistent set of purely empirical premises. But with 
disjunctive premises or conclusions, where the disjuncts are empirical statements and value judgments, 
the dictum can be questioned. For example: “X is not rational” implies “Either is X not rational or X 
should be honoured”. 
Recently, Pekka Väyrynen (2006) has argued that if we accept something like the 
practicality criterion, an important dimension in terms of which such a criterion should 
be applied emerges in the form of an availability condition – what he calls the Cognitive 
Condition: “For any strategy S for acting well and any type of moral agent A, S is 
available to A for use in her practical thinking only to the extent that satisfying the 
conditions for using S in one’s practical thinking lies within the limits of A’s cognitive 
capacities.” As Väyrynen notes, the cognitive capacities of individual agents will differ 
depending on their innate abilities and a variety of circumstantial factors, so the 
interesting category here is that of normal human beings. While normality might be 
difficult to get an firm grip on, if it turns out that regular violations of axioms of 
rationality are the norm rather than the exception, moral theories resting on a 
rationality-centred picture of human agency will tend to struggle to fulfil the Cognitive 
Condition and hence be unlikely to guide us morally in a meaningful way.
A second consideration concerns another famous dictum which moral philosophers 
generally accept, namely the Kantian one that “ought implies can”.3 In its simplest form 
this just means that if people cannot do something, it cannot be the case that they ought 
to do it. This auxiliary principle bridges the is/ought gap. It allows us to draw some 
conclusions about the normative realm using findings in the empirical realm. Of course, 
one could reject the dictum and hold that sometimes we are to blame for not doing 
things even where it would be strictly impossible for us to do so. Tough luck, one might 
say, but morality really is that unyielding. Most of us still accept Kant’s dictum, 
however, and the reason we do so is that moral rightness and wrongness are tied to the 
practice of holding each other responsible. Given this it seems absurd to hold people 
responsible for failing to do something that it would be impossible for them to do.4 
While the first consideration concerned moral thinking from the agent’s perspective, 
this consideration can be said to concern moral thinking from the perspective of the 
bystander.
Now, given a responsibility-oriented rationale for the Kantian dictum, weaker versions 
of it will also tend to have some appeal. In its standard form, it is usually applied on a 
situational basis, but one could argue, more generally, that if a set of moral principles or 
ideals fits ill with our deliberative capacities, it cannot be the case that we ought to live 
by them. Note that here the point is not about the motivational “can” – whether we can 
bring ourselves to effectively will certain things – but rather about the cognitive “can”: 
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wrong-doing or blame presupposes possibility.
given the way human agency functions, there might be certain theories that we cannot 
live by given our cognitive limitations. To blame us for not living by such standards 
would then be like blaming small children for not being able to reason like adults. Of 
course, most children are at least on a path to adulthood; but if we have reason to 
believe that adults simply are not on a path leading to rationality, classically understood, 
and are instead moving towards a range of local improvements in their methods of 
coping with a range of diverse daily tasks, we should perhaps look for ethical theories 
that start out from such a conception of agency.
The third consideration is more overarching and concerns general methodology. If 
moral theorizing were about getting an independent normative order of things right, our 
methodological options would be somewhat slim – in fact, we would seem to be left 
with little more than the hope that nature has granted us a moral sense with which we 
can intuit what is good and what is right. If, by contrast, moral theory is about 
improving actual practices of moral deliberation and argument, the reflective-
equilibrium procedure seems to be the obvious route to follow. Following Norman 
Daniels (1979), it has been commonplace to distinguish between two approaches to 
reflective-equilibrium. The first pursues narrow reflective equilibrium. In it principles 
and considered judgments are gradually adjusted with respect to each other until we 
reach a stable state. While most moral theorists tend to say little about the methodology 
they adhere to, many would probably say that this is what they do if pressed. At any 
rate, something like the reflective-equilibrium procedure certainly seems to capture 
what is actually going on in much contemporary moral theory, where principles are 
suggested and then tested against our intuitive assessments of a range of cases, and 
where one is expected to be prepared to revise some of those intuitive assessments, 
though certainly not all of them.
The wide reflective-equilibrium procedure adds a third category to the process, namely 
that of so-called “background theories”. According to Daniels, these theories might 
include such things as “a theory of the person, a theory of procedural justice, general 
social theory, and a theory of the role of morality in society (including the ideal of a 
well-ordered society).” Obviously, background theories of this kind will tend to be 
fairly abstract and general, but they are clearly the type of theory on which empirical 
findings will have bearing. At this point, those who want to keep their moral philosophy  
pure will probably retort that there really is no need to opt for the wide rather than the 
narrow reflective-equilibrium procedure. The question is whether this response is 
tenable.
The reflective-equilibrium procedure was never intended as an innovation; rather, it 
sought to make explicit what most moral and political philosophers had already been 
doing implicitly. So one of the claims being made, when the ideal of wide reflective 
equilibrium is advanced, is that background theories already play a role in moral theory; 
it is just that their role remains implicit even when people make explicit their reliance 
on the narrow process of adjusting principles and considered judgments.
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Background theories are important in that they provide a general picture of the kinds of 
people, practices, and societies that the rules of morality are supposed to regulate. 
Probably, we already grasp of these matters to an extent, and that is why we can so 
effortlessly focus exclusively on moral theory as such, but that effortlessness should not 
be allowed to conceal the importance of background theories. Assigned the task of 
modifying the rules of a sport, would we be satisfied with a copy of the rulebook, some 
examples of rulings, and then trying to improve on that? If we would, it was probably a 
bad idea to hand us the job.
This is not to deny the Humean dictum. We cannot deduce normative principles from 
empirically informed background theories. The point is that background theories play a 
crucial role in determining the proper domain of the principles. A certain set of 
principles might be better or worse for a variety of reasons, but first it has to be to the 
point. Our choice is not between relying on background theories or not doing so. It is 
between relying on them implicitly or explicitly. When we do normative ethics, we 
always have one or another agent in mind.
In the next two sections we will first delineate the kind of agent that philosophers often 
have in mind when reasoning about human action, many of them will explicitly rely on 
it, but even more of them will implicitly rely on something at least quite similar to it; we 
will then briefly go through some empirical findings that raise doubts about this 
standard account. Some who are familiar with this area might find that we go into 
unnecessary detail about matters that are well-established, others will no doubt find that 
it deserves a much fuller treatment. We have tried to strike a balance here and readers 
who would have liked a fuller treatment should keep in mind that the main point being 
made is just that in areas of philosophy, particularly normative ethics, which rely on 
background accounts of human agency, there is a real need to think much more about 
how normative theory should be done if standard account of human agency are perhaps 
mistaken. 
RATIONAL MAN AND NORMATIVE MAN
While philosophers have had rational agents in mind for a very long time, it was not 
until the twentieth century that they began, more formally, to conceptualize what it 
means to be such an agent. Before we turn to discuss the extent to which people in 
general tend to violate axioms of rationality, we must first spend some time on the 
axioms deployed in the more formal endeavour. Of course, it is impossible to say 
whether earlier philosophers, like Hume and Kant, would have accepted something like 
these axioms, but we will assume that what took place in the twentieth century was not 
an invention of a new philosophical conception, but a formalization of an old one.
In “Truth and probability” Frank Ramsey (1926/1990) describes a completely rational 
decision maker – let us call her, him or it “Rational Man”. Ramsey showed how 
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Rational Man’s beliefs and desires can be measured with a betting method. He showed 
that if Rational Man follows a few intuitive principles of rational behaviour her, his or 
its “degrees of belief” can be represented by a probability measure. Furthermore, he 
showed that Rational Man consistently avoids Dutch books; and that having a coherent 
set of beliefs is a necessary and sufficient condition of doing so.
Ramsey also proved a representation theorem stating that Rational Man’s preferences 
can be represented by a utility function determined up to a positive affine 
transformation. This theorem guarantees the existence of both a probability function and 
an unconditional utility function. The expected utility defined by those functions 
represents Rational Man’s preferences.
Ramsey’s Rational Man would argue that not all probability assessments are rational, 
contrary to what some Bayesians tend to believe. Rational Man should be well-
calibrated. If, for example, an accepted (physical) theory tells us what the chances are of 
a state of affairs obtaining, Rational Man should adjust her, his or its beliefs 
accordingly.
In other words, Ramsey teaches us that, once we have described Rational Man’s degrees 
of belief and preferences, it looks as if she, he or it maximizes expected (subjective) 
utility and acts in agreement with an expected utility theory. The fundamental idea of 
expected utility theory is that two main factors determine our decisions: our desires and 
our beliefs. And expected utility theory provides us with a model of how to handle our 
beliefs and desires, since it provides us with an account of how they combine in rational 
decisions. In any given decision situation, Rational Man chooses the alternative with 
maximal expected utility (the principle of maximizing expected utility).
Description of the decisions of Rational Man makes it appear (de dicto) that she, he or it 
follows a set of axioms or rules. In Ramsey’s presentation there are eight of them. They 
can be separated into three types: behavioural, ontological and mathematical. Axioms of 
the first type restrict Rational Man’s choices and preferences (behaviour). Ontological 
axioms tell us what there is. Mathematical axioms give Rational Man imposing 
computational powers and the observer of her, his or its behaviour enough mathematical 
muscle to prove the representation theorems that narrate the behaviour.
In the present context it is the rationality rules that are of interest. Basically there are 
two of them: ordering assumptions and independence assumptions.
Transitivity, which is an ordering assumption, is one kind of a rationality rule. Rational 
Man’s preferences are assumed to be transitive, and we too, want our preferences to be 
transitive. If they are not, we risk becoming money-pumps.
The independence axioms of decision theory and game theory – e.g. Leonard Savage’s 
Sure-Thing Principle – are another classical type of rationality axiom. Savage’s 
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principle tells us that if an alternative A is judged to be as good as another B in all 
possible states and better than B in at least one, then a rational decision maker will 
prefer A to B. Savage (1954/1972) illustrates the principle with the following case (a 
burning question, also, of today):
“A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the 
outcome of the next presidential election relevant to the attractiveness of the purchase. 
So, to clarify the matter for himself, he asks whether he would buy if he knew that the 
Republican candidate were going to win, and decides that he would do so. Similarly, he 
considers whether he would buy if he knew that the Democratic candidate was going to 
win, and again finds that he would do so. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he 
decides that he should buy, even though he does not know which event obtains, or will 
obtain, … [E]xcept possibly for the assumption of simple ordering, I know of no other 
extralogical principle governing decisions that finds such ready acceptance”. (p. 21)
Similarly, moving to game theory, and assuming stated probabilities, the so-called 
strong independence axiom, tells us that for all outcomes A, B, C, and probability p > 0, 
A is better than B if and only if a prospect, A with probability p and C with probability 1 
- p, is better than a prospect, B with probability p and C with probability 1 - p.
Savage formulated the Sure-Thing Principle in 1954. His view of probability, by his 
own account,5 derives mainly from the work of De Finetti and is inspired by Ramsey’s 
forceful discussion. Savage’s theory, set out in The Foundations of Statistics, is in many 
respects similar to Ramsey’s, but instead of giving us a narrative of an ideal he presents 
a normative theory: that is, Savage’s theory tells us how we ought to choose. Ramsey’s 
theory, by contrast, is descriptive. If we assume, however, that the decisions of the ideal 
agent, Rational Man, are the best that can be made, a normative interpretation of 
Ramsey is not far away.6
That man acts to maximize his own well being, given the information he has, is an old 
idea. It is found in the works of J. S. Mill, and we know it as the Homo economicus 
hypothesis. With Savage’s theory Normative Man was reborn and the assumptions 
behind Normative Man were made into a testable psychological hypothesis.7 Now the 
thought was that human reasoning and decision-making could roughly be modelled by 
subjective expected utility theory, i.e. a Ramsey-De Finetti-Savage type theory. Among 
psychologists, generic expected utility theory has since received wide approval as the 
normative model of rational decision-making. 
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The Sure-Thing Principle and the ordering axioms are accepted by many (perhaps most) 
decision theorists. Though they sometimes appear counter-intuitive, they are considered 
cornerstones of rationality: principles that Rational Man follows and Normative Man 
ought to follow. Are they also cornerstones within the context of ethical theory? This is 
difficult to tell since ethical theorists tend to operate with a largely unexamined 
conception of agency, but basic instrumental rationality would still seem to form a core 
conception uniting ethical theorists from the main traditions. And since it is difficult to 
evaluate a conception of agency we can at best guess at, we have chosen here to focus 
on the decision-theoretical counterpart.
THE IRRATIONALITY CLAIM
It has been claimed that we are irrational, the suggestion being that we do not stick to 
the behavioural axioms of classical theories of rationality, and that we frequently break 
the most basic and obvious laws of logic. This claim has been disputed and is frequently  
rejected by philosophers. Today, however, experimental data rather unambiguously 
show that we are no ideal decision makers – that we cannot claim to be intuitive 
logicians. Those who deny this seem to be quibbling about mere words rather than 
substance. Let us briefly review a number of classical and well-known examples of 
irrational behaviour.
The certainty effect. Probably the best-known violation of a classical behavioural axiom 
is the certainty effect, highlighted in various versions by Allais (1979) and Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979).
Kahneman and Tversky asked subjects to choose between four prospects. First, they 
made a choice between (A) and (B); then, between (C) and (D). The prospects were 
constructed as follows:
(A) 2500 (Israeli pounds) with probability 0.33, 2400 with probability 0.66 or 0 with 
probability 0.01.
(B) 2400 with certainty.
(C) 2500 with probability 0.33 or 0 with probability 0.67.
(D) gives 2400 with probability 0.34 or 0 with probability 0.66.
They found that 82% of the subjects preferred B to A, and that 83% preferred C to D – 
choices which, in combination, imply a pair of incompatible utility inequalities.
Clearly, it is the Sure-Thing Principle that is violated.8 It is this axiom that asserts that if 
two alternatives have a common outcome for a particular state of nature, the ordering of 
the alternatives should be independent of that outcome. In other words, more than 80% 
of us are not fully rational.
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The conjunction fallacy. Linda, Tversky & Kahneman (1983) told their subjects, is 31 
years old, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student she was 
deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated 
in anti-nuclear demonstrations. The subjects were then asked which of two alternatives 
– (A) Linda is a bank teller and (B) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement – was the more probable. In this case 85% of the subjects answered (B). But 
(B) is the conjunction of (A) and “Linda is an active feminist”, and a conjunction cannot 
be more probable than one of its conjuncts.
It has been questioned (see, for example, Levi (1985) and Gigerenzer (1991)) whether 
this behaviour involves a violation of probability theory, whether it really shows that we 
are irrational, or less than fully rational.9 It has been asked whether, in one way or 
another, the behaviour can be explained away. On its face, however, it is a direct 
violation of the fundamental axioms of classical theory: Rational Man would be 
unwilling to join the 85% of respondents under suspicion.
The base-rate fallacy. In a study David Eddy gave physicians the following 
information. For a woman aged 40 who participates in routine screening the probability 
of breast cancer is 1%. If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she 
will have a positive mammogram. If a woman does not have breast cancer, the 
probability is 10% that she will still have a positive mammogram. Physicians were 
asked to consider a woman of 40 with a positive mammogram. Eddy then asked what 
the probability is that she in fact has breast cancer.
In Eddy’s study 95% estimated the probability to be between 0.7 and 0.8. The correct 
value is 0.075. Eddy’s observation, that we neglect base-rates, has been confirmed by 
several other studies. We make erroneous probabilistic inferences. Our guesstimates 
stand in glaring contrast with Rational Man’s calculated estimate and fail to accord with 
traditional Bayesian probability (decision) theory.
It is obvious that this type of “irrational” inference, where we take insufficient account 
of known statistical evidence, can, directly or indirectly, cause harm or lead to 
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maltreatment – and, if worse were to come to worst, could even lead to death. Failure to 
be fully rational has moral implications.10
Overconfidence. Psychologists have shown that we are overconfident. They have 
established this by asking subjects a series of knowledge questions. For example: Which 
city has more inhabitants? The subject is offered two alternative answers – in this 
example, Hyderabad and Islamabad. The subject is then asked how confident he or she 
is that the answer is correct, expressed on a scale of 50–100% in steps of 10%. The 
problem is that confidence does not match the relative frequency of correct answers. 
When an average subject claims that he or she is 100% confident that the answer is 
correct, the relative frequency of correct answers is around 80%. When the confidence 
estimate is 90%, the number of correct answers drops to around 75%, and so on.
This “bias” is not a direct violation of one or other axiom of decision theory. It is 
possible to be overconfident and at the same time remain perfectly coherent; and it is 
the latter that the classical theories demand – not that we are goal-rational, just that we 
are internally rational. But empirical findings strongly indicate that we are not well 
calibrated. As Ramsey pointed out, if one is a decision maker, being well calibrated is a 
good thing.
 
The selection task. The selection task was designed by P. C. Wason (1966). The subject 
is shown a set of four cards placed on a table. Each card has a vowel on one side and a 
number on the other side. The visible faces of the cards show A, 4, D, and 7. The 
subject is asked which cards he or she wants to turn over in order to determine the truth 
of the following proposition: If a card shows a vowel on one face, its opposite face 
shows an even number.
The most frequent answers are A or both A and 4. The correct answer is A and 7. 
Incidentally, it can be added that one of the two authors of this paper has, in teaching 
philosophy of science since the early 1980s, given his students the selection task. By 
now the informal results of well over 1000 respondents (undergraduates, graduates, 
researchers and faculty members) confirm Wason’s original result. People exhibit fairly 
limited logical ability, and it seems not to matter how far you have advanced in your 
studies or career, or what type of training you have (humanities, medicine, engineering 
– or mathematics, for that matter).
Wason’s selection task triggered a vast debate and discussion. In the course of this it has 
been shown, among other things, that people do better if the task is contextualised, and 
constructed in terms of social relations or everyday activities. But the fact remains: we 
are not intuitive logicians. We break the rules of logic. If logic is a prerequisite of 
rationality, we are less than fully rational. 
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Valuing lives. Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson and Friedrich (1997) have studied a 
phenomenon called “psychophysical numbing”. Subjects were asked to point out the 
number of lives a medical research institute would have to save to get a $10 million 
grant. When 15 000 lives were at risk the median value was 9000 lives saved. When 
290 000 were at risk, the median value was 100 000 lives saved. As Slovic (2007) 
points out, “respondents saw saving 9000 lives in the “smaller” population as more 
valuable than saving ten times as many lives in the largest” (p. 85).
Empirical studies of life-saving lead us to expect, Slovic says, that there will be more 
support for saving 80% of 100 lives that are at risk than there is for saving 20% of 1000 
lives at risk. We prefer to reduce deaths from 4000 to 3000 rather than reduce deaths 
from 103 000 to 102 000. This contradicts the familiar nostrum that every human life is 
of equal value.11 Slovic argues that studies of this kind show a cumulative collapse of 
compassion: the value of life-saving dramatically decreases as the number of lives 
saved increases. We simply fail to comprehend big numbers – an empirical fact with 
moral implications. The Darfur crisis is but one example.12 The explanation given is that 
the affective response is greatest when the group consists of one (identifiable) 
individual, and that this response declines as the number of group members increases.
Affects are, according to contemporary cognitive psychology, a conscious or 
unconscious experience of goodness or badness and very context-dependent. Finucane 
et al. (2003) argue that growing quantities of empirical data support the claim that 
affective states are a key driver in choice and decision-making. The life-saving 
intervention studies appear to reveal a phenomenon known as “proportion dominance”. 
Saving nearly all of the individuals in a small group is far more important, as a decision 
trigger, than the expectation that one will save the maximum number of individuals.
It is argued that a decision maker who behaves like Normative Man, or Ramsey’s 
Rational Man, reasons logically and consciously, encodes reality in symbols, words and 
numbers, and seeks justification. These types of process are generally slow. Affective 
decision-making, on the other hand, encodes reality in images, metaphors and 
narratives. It reacts swiftly on the basis of memories or images of good and bad, 
pleasure and pain – a process that is generally swift. Affective decisions can lead to 
actions that are judged in retrospect to be irrational.13
11
11 Of course, deontologists and consequentialists disagree over whether it is acceptable to kill some 
people to rescue a larger number (i.e. disagree on the question whether the duty of beneficence is itself 
morally constrained in certain important ways). The cases under consideration here avoid this issue and 
merely involve rescuing different numbers of people.
12 See Slovic (2007).
13 For discussion of the affects and decision-making, and so-called System 1 and System 2 theories, see, 
for example, Finucane et al. (2003), Kahneman (2003), Slovic (2007) and Sahlin et al. (2008).
One-eyedness. Numerous experimental studies have shown that we generate too few, 
and excessively narrow, hypotheses. In addition, we collect information and evidence in 
favour of our guesses that is too narrow, selected because it is readily available, and 
skewed in favour of our existing beliefs. Once we have a preferred hypothesis, we look 
for confirmatory evidence, neglecting countervailing evidence. We are, in other words, 
short-sighted and one-eyed when it comes to strategies of discovery and justification.
This idiosyncrasy need not make us irrational, if by that we mean incoherent and 
illogical.
Let us sum up this section. Almost half a century of psychological research has shown 
that, as decision makers, we are short-sighted, one-eyed and prone to a serious error of 
refraction. We definitely are not blessed with the sharp eyes of Ramsey’s Rational Man, 
or of Economic Man. In this respect we are all more or less irrational.
On the other hand, it must be observed that the experimental findings point in various 
directions. There is more than one concept of rationality under attack here. First, we are 
irrational because we are not coherent, i.e. because we do not follow the rules of 
rational behaviour that appear in traditional decision and probability theory. Second, we 
are irrational because we break some basic rules of first-order logic, the core of all 
rational thought. Third, we are irrational because we do not have, and seem not to desire 
to have, calibrated beliefs. Fourth, we are irrational because we make decisions too fast 
– decisions which, reflecting on what we did, we realise, contradict our beliefs and 
values.
There may be ways to explain away some of these findings and insist that the studies do 
not show what they give the impression of showing, but the problem is just that the 
findings are as consistent as they are persistent. The mark of a reasonable framework for 
understanding human agency is not the capacity for finding within it alternative possible 
explanations for findings which the framework at the outset did not lead us to expect. 
We ourselves would favour a more piecemeal approach in this area, but piecemeal 
attempts to explain away the data in order to save a favoured account, will always tend 
to seem a bit like exercises in drawing epicycles. This is not to say that the standard 
account has been conclusively disproved, because it has not, but for the remainder of 
this paper it will be assumed that the claim of irrationality is largely corroborated by 
empirical findings: that in actual human behaviour we face what might be called the fact 
of irrationality. This is obviously not the same as saying that all of us are more or less 
irrational more or less all of the time. The point is rather that the picture of human 
agency that emerges from the empirical results is not one of human beings (as it were) 
halfway there to rationality, i.e. of beings whose problem-solving capacities largely 
build on a dim grasp of certain rules of rationality and logic, a grasp that we can 
possibly improve on, but which is essentially already there somehow. The emergent 
picture is rather one of beings possessing a virtual tool-box of heuristic devices, affects 
and instincts. These devices might be perfectly explainable by evolutionary processes; 
12
they perform well in some contexts and lead us into error in others. Given such a 
picture, irrationality involving violations of classic axioms of rationality will be an 
endemic and ineliminable feature of human behaviour. This does not necessarily mean 
that there is anything wrong with us. What it does mean is that the background 
conception of human agency we should have in mind when thinking about normative 
ethics is not so much Rational Man as something like Heuristic Man: a person whose 
competence is context-dependent and whose deliberative skills do not necessarily 
transfer from one context to another; a person whose modes of thinking will inevitably 
be deeply shaped by a range of factors beyond agency as such.14 Equally, the picture we 
should not rely on is that of an agent with a unified set of principles of rationality she, 
he or it simply applies to every type of situation. Of course, as decision theorists we 
might, perhaps, say with Isaac Levi (1997) that the behavioural axioms are for “rational 
angels”, but for ethical theorists who profess to address us the problem is potentially a 
deep one: this is just not how we work.
MORAL AGENCY AND ETHICAL THEORY THROUGH THICK AND THIN
In most cases background theories tend to reside, somewhat inaccessibly, in… well, the 
background. This means that although, to the reader of books and papers in moral 
theory, it will usually be reasonably clear what kinds of pictures of human agency 
different authors are working with, it remains very difficult to criticize them for relying 
on a specific account of human agency. And there is a further difficulty here insofar as it  
would hardly be feasible to look at all versions of the major types of theory in turn, one 
at a time. So we find ourselves not only with the need to generalize, but under pressure 
to do so with respect to things that are most often merely implicit. From the point of 
view of enquiry, clearly, this is far from ideal, but it should be kept in mind that our aim 
here is primarily to raise certain doubts, albeit potentially very serious ones, rather than 
to establish anything conclusively.
We would say that, within mainstream ethical theory, approaches to human agency, 
whether implicit or explicit, tend to fall into two main categories. To begin with there is 
a “thin” approach.15 The emphasis here is agency as such. The aim is to provide an 
abstract characterization of what is involved in being an agent, the idea then being that 
humans happen to exemplify this notion. This approach is evident in the work of Kant, 
where being human simply means being a finite rational being, or more precisely, a 
13
14 We will not enter into it here, but psychologists have also shown that in decision situations gender, 
race, and social status influence risk-taking. See, for example, Finucane et al. (2000) and Slovic (2000). 
15 “Thin” and ”thick” are not used here to distinguish between that which is purely normative and that 
which is both normative and descriptive; rather, it has to do with the degree of anthropological detail in 
accounts of human agency. 
being that combines rationality with the possession of inclinations.16 Even in a more 
fleshed-out Kantian picture of “humanity” abilities such as the capacity to represent 
ends and act on principles remain central. These are features, very clearly, that could be 
possessed by members of species other than our own, homo sapiens – something which 
can be seen as an advantage of the theory, as a sign of its universality. However, the 
problem is just that a general construal of agency with application to a range of possible 
species promotes a picture of agency that does not really capture actual human agency. 
How can we be thought to act on principles, in any interesting sense of the notion, when 
our deliberative capacities, as judged by traditional models of rationality, are as 
regularly erratic as they have been shown to be? 
The standard interpretation, among Kantians, of the role of maxims is that we more or 
less always act on them,17 and what this means is that for adult human beings there is 
always a generalistic aspect to our actions, a principled element. Even if we do not 
always act explicitly on the basis of some sort of policy, it is reasonable to insist that 
policy-like states lie behind our more specific choices. Children, it is said, are not 
capable of this, but somewhere along the line we supposedly acquire the relevant 
capacity. But the psychological research outlined above indicates that, on a line from 
children to Rational Man, human adults do not really move that far. In fact, it can be 
asked whether human development is mainly a matter of moving along such a line at 
all, rather than acquiring a wider and wider range of diverse tools with which we can 
handle ourselves in a wider and wider range of situations. It might be reasonable to 
conceive of someone like Rational Man always acting on maxims, but there seems to be 
little reason to suppose that actual human beings exhibit, in their behaviour, the kind of 
principled generality that would licence a self-understanding in which we always act, at 
least implicitly, on maxims – and this means that the categorical imperative is not a 
meaningful moral test for beings like us.18 
Consequentialism is not consistently explicit, in the way Kantianism is, about its 
preferred image of agency; but it is difficult not to see, in the consequentialist approach, 
a universal rendering of traditional theories of rationality, with the agent being asked to 
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16 As is shown by Jerome Schneewind in The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), Kant’s ethics should be understood against a background including the debate, between 
voluntarists and antivoluntarists, about whether God is above the moral law, or whether human beings 
and God basically belong to the same moral community. Kant adopted the latter stance, and with that 
came a conception of agency attempts to capture the agency both of God and of us. For Kant, the main 
difference here is that we have inclinations, which is why the moral law takes the form of an imperative 
for human agents; but the fact that we are so (very) far from God-like deliberative powers should surely 
be an enormously important factor in any attempt to understand human moral agency.
17 For an influential interpreter, see Onora O’Neill (1989), Part II.
18 At least not the Formula of Universal Law. It might be possible to construe a version of Kantian ethics 
strictly in terms of the Formula of Humanity that is compatible with a more realistic psychological 
account, but that would involve quite a radical turn from traditional Kantian ethics.
maximize overall, rather than his individual, good.19 This move to a universalism 
involves some difficult issues in its own right, primarily having to do with the 
possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons and how aggregation across individuals 
is to be best understood; but even setting those (slightly) complicated matters aside, one 
might question the wisdom of any attempt to construct a moral theory relying on a more 
complicated counterpart of what might very well already be a misguided approach to 
individual agency. In the consequentialist framework, contexts enter in only as areas 
where the theory is to be applied. However, contexts are not just situations in which we 
happen to find ourselves; rather they seem to enter already in the formation of human 
decision-making capacities. Why, then, should we adopt a single and unified picture of 
ideal moral deliberation?
In contrast with the approaches of Kantians and consequentialists, there is a “thick” 
approach to human agency in which the emphasis is on the human element. The goal 
here is to understand our agency largely in terms of the emotional or affective capacities 
that we possess as members of a particular species, homo sapiens. This approach is 
most clearly seen in virtue ethics, especially in the Aristotelian tradition, although the 
ethics of care might also be taken to fall within this category. 
If the main problem with thin theories is that they tend to be too ideal, a potential 
problem with thick theories is that they are not ideal enough. This is not the complaint 
that such theories are unable to provide us with ethical guidance,20 but rather that, for a 
thick theory to be normative at all, it would have to involve not just a characterization of 
our affective capacities, but also an understanding of what constitutes good exercise of 
them. Of course, in Aristotelianism this understanding is presented in terms of the way 
in which reason gradually, over time, influences our affective capacities so that they 
become more accurate and insightful. Now, even if Aristotelianism takes a range of 
actual aspects of human psychology into account, it should be noted that it still operates 
with the notion of a unified ideal agent. Even if the phronimos is perhaps thought to be 
an unreachable ideal, the basic idea is still that a context is something into which the 
agent enters and then applies universal powers of reasoning. However, there is really no 
basis for thinking that the development of human beings runs along a track towards 
15
19 Consequentialism and decision theory have much in common. Good arguments against the axioms of 
the theories of rational decision-making are often, though not always, also good arguments against 
consequentialist theories. A difference is that decision theories more often deal with uncertainties: 
consequentialist theories sometimes ignore this complication. Someone might therefore argue that the 
problems of rationality listed above, the examples of irrational behaviour, are problematic for theories 
trying to incorporate uncertainty. This is only true up to a point. Experimental findings showing that we 
have intransitive preferences, that we reverse our preferences in an irrational way, that we fail to grasp big 
numbers, and that our utility (preference) assignments (constructions) are far too context-dependent, all 
hit consequentialist theories as much as they hit theories of rational decision making. See, for example, 
Slovic (2000) and Lichtenstein & Slovic (2006) for relevant empirical studies. 
20 Such worries are ably addressed in Ulrik Kihlbom (2000).
such a unified and balanced power of judgment.21 Thus although the thick approach 
looks more promising than its thin cousin, its most prominent version, Aristotelianism, 
continues to still presuppose, at its core, a picture of human rational powers that would 
not seem to have any reasonable ground.22
Moreover, some have argued that while it involves a richer moral psychology than 
Kantianism and consequentialism, Aristotelianism relies on a bad psychological model 
when it comes to character traits: it assumes a model according to which human beings 
have stable and general character traits of a kind that, as a matter of fact, we simply do 
not have.23 This is not the place to review the growing literature on this particular issue, 
though it might be noted that in many ways this attack on Aristotelianism has a certain 
kinship with the ideas put forward here – namely, that the way in which human 
decision-making is driven by concrete heuristics, and is context-specific all the way 
down, makes the ideal of the phronimos seem an unpromising one. 
A POSSIBLE RECOURSE: TWO-LEVEL APPROACHES
While the thick approach is closest to what will, in the end, be suggested here as a 
possible way forward, thin theorists have a response available that must be addressed 
before we proceed. For many thin theorists would not actually contend that the core 
theory should be used to guide our choices in any thorough-going sense. One can find 
both consequentialists and Kantians advocating some kind of two-level approach in 
which high theory is supposedly demarcated in a way that at least partially separates it 
from most of our daily routines and practices.
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21 It is well known that people improve in their decision making and problem-solving if the tasks are 
contextualised, and constructed in terms of, for example, social relations or everyday activities. But it 
seems safe to say that rationality is not a question of training. If that were the case one would expect 
scientific training to ensure that one does better in the selection task; but this seems not to be the case (see 
above). We know that we do not make decisions that accord with the decision maxims. But even more 
interesting is the fact that good arguments for the ideal rarely convince those to whom they are put of the 
correctness and applicability of the theory. In fact arguments for rationality seem to have a direct and 
negative effect on “rational” behaviour. Arguments for irrationality seem to do two things: first, they 
strengthen the convictions of those already irrational, and second, they make the rational irrational. See 
Slovic & Tversky (1974).
22 When discussing Aristotelianism, we should keep in mind Aristotle’s discussion in Topics. In book III 
of Topics Aristotle lays the foundation of modern preference logic. He works with two concepts of 
preferability: “worthy of choice” and “better”, one situation-specific and one absolute, one describing 
common man and one describing, one could say, a rational angel. Among the principles Aristotle 
discusses is the contra-position principle, a thin version of Savage’s sure-thing principle, the substitutivity 
condition, and a maxi-max rule of choice. These are principles which we can assume an ideal agent 
follows, but which are problematic, or not fulfilled, in terms of “worthy of choice”. See Sahlin (1993).
23 See John Doris (2002).
The consequentialist two-level approach builds on a vital distinction between accounts 
of right-making characteristics and decision procedures.24 While the former provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions of an action being morally right, decision 
procedures are intended to be used in everyday life. The idea is that we need not 
demand, of the former, that it can be utilized as the latter;25 it might be enough that the 
former can be used in the cool hour of reflection in order to evaluate in a general way 
our decision procedures and think about how to improve on them.26 A consequentialist 
of this kind could accept something like Väyrynen’s Cognitive Condition for the kinds 
of decision-making strategy that the consequentialist account of rightness should help 
us select. 
Of course, this still leaves us with the problem that someone should ideally be able to 
evaluate our decision procedures in the light of a criterion of rightness, and accordingly 
there will always be a worry about whether such a massive calculative effort can be 
carried out to a satisfactory degree by creatures like us, even in a careful and collective 
effort. The admission, or discovery, that only angels could successfully execute this 
procedure would probably sever the link between consequentialist theory and our 
everyday practices; and then there might no longer be any substantial sense, even an 
indirect one, in which the theory provides us with guidance.
At a more principled level, one might ask whether the consequentialist criterion of 
rightness does not still presuppose something like Rational Man as a background theory 
of ideal agency within the context of the reflective-equilibrium procedure with which 
we are presumably trying to proceed in our ethical theorizing. If we were beings located 
somewhere on a developmental path towards this ideal, that might be reasonable. But if 
human deliberative capacities are primarily context-based and situational, then, while 
we might theoretically understand its workings, Rational Man might not be a relevant 
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24 The locus classicus of this distinction is Eugene Bales (1971).
25 Let us look briefly at the distinction between right-making characteristics and decision procedures from 
a decision-theoretical perspective. In this case the former provides necessary and sufficient conditions for 
rational decision-making, and the decision procedures are rules for everyday life decision-making. This 
distinction mirrors the one we made between rational angles and human decision makers, or Aristotle’s 
distinction between “better than” and “worthy of choice”. It also highlights an interesting problem. 
Decision theorists have tried to modify the axioms of the theory of rational decision making in order to 
make the theory less demanding – e.g. making the theory more prescriptive than normative, or allowing 
for imprecise probability and value judgments. See Sahlin (1985), and Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1988) for 
discussion of competing nonstandard decision theories. The problem is that no matter what we choose to 
give up or change (the axioms of independence or the ordering), we, as decision makers, run into all sorts 
of more or less serious and unwanted difficulties. See Seidenfeld (1988). And it looks as if it is only by 
following the true path of rationality (i.e. adhering to classical theories of rational decision making) that 
we can steer clear of the snags. Theories of rational decision-making are far more formalized than 
normative moral philosophies. But it can be anticipated that normative moral theories, moving in a 
similar direction, away from the ideal agent’s absolute rationality, will run into analogous problems. 
Consequentialist theories will definitely do so.
26 One could certainly take a further step, maintaining that, qua account of right-making characteristics, a 
theory can be acceptable even if yields the recommendation that we would be better off without it: see 
Derek Parfit (1984). Given the general methodological considerations above, such a stance would, 
however, be highly unsatisfactory.
ideal. If the distinction between decision procedures and the criterion of rightness could 
be mapped on to a distinction between our agency and the agency of an improved 
version of us, then certainly, at least within the context of a wide reflective-equilibrium 
procedure, it might make sense to adopt a two-level approach. But if our agency is not 
merely a slightly inferior version of Rational Man, but requires to be understood quite 
differently, the consequentialist two-level theory (at least) would seem to represent an 
unpromising avenue of research. 
The Kantian version of the two-level approach deploys a distinction between ideal and 
non-ideal theory.27 An ideal theory specifies the principles regulating a society where 
there is complete, or at least almost complete, compliance with the dictates of morality, 
and where no obstacles prevent the realization of ideal institutions. Non-ideal theory 
deals with how we should proceed if we find ourselves in a world where there are 
problems with compliance and/or the conditions needed for establishing the appropriate 
institutions. Armed with this distinction, of course, one might interpret the fact that we 
are often irrational as a problem of the second kind: our irrationality stands in the way 
of realizing (anything remotely similar to) a Kingdom of Ends here on Earth. 
The problem with this approach is that, unlike the consequentialist two-level approach, 
Kantian high theory is still supposed to perform a guiding role in everyday life, even if 
we will often have to rely on non-ideal theory there as well. The reason for this is that 
non-ideal theory is not intended to be complete; it is just intended to be a complement. 
So Kantians are vulnerable to a dilemma: either they develop non-ideal theory to the 
point where it is more or less complete in its own right (in which case the approach as a 
whole will probably lose its distinctly Kantian character) or they stick with ideal theory 
of the kind intended to play a role in everyday life (in which case doubts inevitably arise 
about the viability of this ideal in view of our serious failings as rational beings).
OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: MID-LEVEL THEORY
These remarks on existing ethical theories are, of course, broad and sweeping. Many 
readers will undoubtedly conclude that their favoured theory is untouched by them. But 
our aim is not to disprove every current moral theory. It is rather to point to a peculiar 
fact about moral theorizing in general – namely, that so little attempt has been made to 
build theories by starting with the reasonable assumption that actual human agency does 
not approximate to the imagined agency of Rational Man. The argument here is not that 
the usual approach is an impossible one. It is rather that too much energy and time has 
been devoted to it rather than the investigation of other possibilities.
In comparing thin and thick approaches to human agency from this perspective, we are 
bound to feel that there is something right in the thick theory; the problem is just that, at 
least in its most common form, it still is a theory operating with a picture of human 
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27 The locus classicus here is John Rawls (1971); see also Christine Korsgaard (1986).
beings as more or less rational (as this is traditionally understood). As already pointed 
out, actual human beings are probably better compared to the figure of Heuristic Man 
rather than the “almost there” Rational Man; and whereas most of this paper has been 
concerned with negative or destructive aspects of this observation, the most important 
question is what ethical theorizing ought to look like if we have the second picture of 
human agency in mind. One answer immediately suggests itself: if human decision-
making is ultimately fragmented, in the sense that we have a diversity of concrete and 
often disunited ways of coping with different types of situation, then perhaps normative 
ethics should not be working towards unified and all-encompassing theories.      
If we give up the hope of a grand theory uniting human problem-solving in the exercise 
of certain fundamental rules, another type of approach naturally invites itself – a more 
pragmatic approach. We can instead start by identifying typical human choice-situations 
and the types of strategy employed in them. From there we can move on, given a certain 
type of situation and the problem-solving strategies usually employed by humans there, 
to consider what would constitute an improvement in such strategies. The extent to 
which there can be improvements will not, however, be determined by an antecedent 
standard of rationality. Rather it will respect the actual layout of the types of situation in 
which we find ourselves. Room for ideals in such an approach remains. It is just that the 
ideals will arise out of the need to work our way out of particular clashes and conflicts 
between different aspects of our thinking rather than out of a will to achieve 
overarching unity.
It should be noted that surrender of the ideal of Rational Man as a background theory of 
human agency does not mean that we have to surrender rationality as an ideal in the 
conduct of philosophy. The latter is a slow, thoughtful, and collective effort, and just as 
other areas might have their own modes of thinking – modes that suit them – rationality, 
especially in playing by rules of logic, might very well be precisely the type of ideal that  
suits philosophy. It is just that there is a difference between rationally dissecting and 
considering different areas of human concern and activity, on the one hand, and having 
rationality as a standard defining what constitutes possible improvements of our actual 
decision-making processes within all of these areas, on the other. Changes to our 
decision-making that count as ethical improvements might or might not be available. To 
see whether they are, and to address the further question of wherein such improvements 
would consist, we would have to pay much closer attention to all the intricacies of such 
areas and to our actual practices of dealing with them than is usual in normative ethics 
today. Among current ethical theories, the one probably most in sync with this kind of 
methodological ideal is the ethics of care, for this does not seek an understanding of 
morality as a whole, but is focused on the ethical dimension of certain types of situation 
and relation.28
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28 For a leading example, see Nel Noddings (1984). However, even among some of its advocates, this 
feature of the ethics of care is sometimes seen as a drawback; and there are those who seek to expand it 
into a general ethical theory (e.g. Michael Slote (2007)). But what is really needed is not yet another 
grand ethical theory, but a greater range of mid-level theories.
This last approach, which might be called “mid-level theory”, is a piecemeal enterprise. 
It is difficult to say exactly what might come out of it, simply because there has been so 
little done resembling it within moral theory, but it is imaginable that something like the 
ideal of reflective equilibrium could still function as a model for it. It is just that one of 
the roles that would now be played by background theories is that of delineating the 
types of choice situation and scenario in which different problem-solving abilities and 
ideas (which might work satisfactorily in some contexts) will be out of their depth and 
perhaps clash with the workings of other abilities and ideas. One thing that needs to be 
emphasized, however, is that a piecemeal approach need not be toothless: it is quite 
possible that large areas of common-sense morality and current ethical practice 
implicitly rely on outmoded pictures of human agency, and that reform would in fact 
greatly improve them.
What will have to go is the notion of one fund of principles and one fund of considered 
judgments that should be adjusted with respect to each other. The situation is much 
more complex than that, and any movement towards reflective equilibrium will in all 
likelihood take place by way of a series of demarcations and local fixes rather than in 
any grand unifying transformation of the system as a whole. In a way, the moral theorist 
we see coming out of this is less an architect trying to redesign an existing building in 
order to get rid of a few flaws in the original design and more the janitor trying to find 
workable solutions to a wide range of problems within a sprawling building complex 
for which there never was an architect in the first place.
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